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A NEW SENTENCING BLUEPRINT: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ALLOWS
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE FRAUD CONVICTIONS
TO BE OFFSET BY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
PERFORMANCE IN UNITED STATES v. NAGLE
CHRISTOPHER C. REESE*
“Sentencing white-collar offenders presents vexing issues in determining
the appropriate punishment for conduct that may not immediately ap-
pear criminal, or that may involve amorphous victims . . . .”1
I. BREAKING GROUND: AN INTRODUCTION TO DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE FRAUD
Financial fraud inflicts devastating consequences upon its victims.2
According to one scholar, “new, undetected financial frauds are hatched
every day.”3  Furthermore, “the amount of direct losses to investors . . .
now dwarf[s] those of earlier fraud eras.”4  Such financial crimes have
caused “thousands of people” billions of dollars in losses and “take[n] a
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2011, Washington College.  Many thanks to my friends and family, especially
to my mother and to Grandmom and Grandpop “C” for their constant support,
and Jordan M. Gregro, Esq. for her love and encouragement.  Special thanks to K.
Edward Raleigh, Esq. for his insight into the federal criminal sentencing process,
and to all of the Villanova Law Review editors whose hard work and constructive
feedback helped make this Casebrief a reality.
1. Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?,
61 WAYNE L. REV. 27, 33–34 (2015).
2. See Financial Fraud Crimes Victims, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/victim-witness/victim-info/financial-fraud [https://
perma.cc/J9E7-ARL4] (last updated Feb. 10, 2015) (discussing harm frequently
suffered by financial fraud victims).
3. See Bruce L. Simon, A Commonsense Approach to Financial Fraud Cases, TRIAL
MAG., Apr. 1, 2003, at 73, 73 (discussing methods attorneys can use to detect finan-
cial fraud).
4. See Daniel V. Dooley, Sr., & Mark Radke, Does Severe Punishment Deter Finan-
cial Crimes?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 621 (2010) (discussing regulatory perspec-
tive after large-scale financial crimes committed by executives of WorldCom,
Enron, Adelphia, and Cendant).  The authors contrast these crimes with the
“multi-billion dollar ‘Ponzi’ schemes” committed by “Bernie Madoff, Scott Roth-
stein, and Allen Stanford . . . .” See id. at 620–21 (citing Amy Sherman & Jay
Weaver, Rothstein Expected to Plead Guilty in Scheme, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 5, 2010,
8:19 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/rothstein-ex
pected-to-plead-guilty-in-scheme/1063336 [https://perma.cc/S34Q-SUMH]); see
also Karen Berman & Joe Knight, What Did Bernard Madoff Do?, HARVARD BUS. REV.
(June 30, 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/06/what-did-bernard-madoff-do [https://
perma.cc/C7DF-BWRV] (examining Bernie Madoff’s historically large financial
crime).
(681)
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staggering human toll.”5  Despite the occurrence of recent, historically sig-
nificant financial crimes, you are much more likely to encounter someone
who committed fraud totaling far less than a billion dollars, where the
number of victims and amount of losses are much harder to identify.6
For instance, suppose you know someone who tricked the govern-
ment into giving his or her company federally-funded construction con-
tracts “set aside for . . . disadvantaged enterprises.”7  Despite the
deception, the contracts were fully performed, and no involved parties lost
money.8  The federal prosecutor assigned to this case may have difficulty
determining what sentence to seek.9  On the other hand, defense counsel
will need to know how to best protect the guilty defendant’s freedom.10
Given the government’s recent increased scrutiny of construction con-
tracts and “movement toward increased legal action and harsher penalties
5. See Henning, supra note 1, at 28–29 (quoting Sentencing Hearing Tran-
script at 47, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-CR-213 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090629sentencingtranscript
corrected.pdf [https://perma.cc/STK3-R2M6] [hereinafter Sentencing Hearing])
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Eric Tucker, Sentencing Changes Sought
for Business Crimes, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.memphisdailynews.
com/news/2014/aug/14/sentencing-changes-sought-for-business-crimes [https:/
/perma.cc/MGD2-87H9].
6. See Henning, supra note 1, at 33–34 (discussing difficulties of white-collar
crime sentencing); Peter J. Henning, The Challenge of Sentencing White-Collar Defend-
ants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013, 2:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
02/25/the-challenge-of-sentencing-white-collar-defendants/?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/9JN4-5QYC] (noting that “impact of white-collar offenses is far broader
than most street crimes, but also much more diffuse”); see also Bradley J. Sauer,
Deterring False Claims in Government Contracting: Making Consistent Use of 18 U.S.C.
§ 287, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 897, 911 n.91 (2010) (“To term procurement fraud a
victimless crime is . . . an oversimplification . . . . [because] [t]he [g]overnment
and the public at large are victims every time a false claim is submitted on a gov-
ernment contract.”).  However, “procurement fraud” is often viewed as a “vic-
timless crime” because “no individual is particularly harmed by the act.” See id.;
Marion Barriskell, Fraud: A Victimless Crime?, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/eas-
tafrica/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Fraud%20-%20a
%20victimless%20crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH87-CMQ8] (last visited Oct.
10, 2016) (discussing perception of fraud as crime with “no victims to the act”).
7. See United States v. Nagle, Crim. No. 1:09-CR-384, 2015 WL 7710467, at
*1–2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2015) (describing factual background of case).  This hypo-
thetical is based on the facts of Nagle. See id.  For a discussion of the facts of Nagle,
see infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
8. See Nagle, 2015 WL 7710467, at *2 (discussing profitability of contracts).
9. See Dana Liebelson, Why Nobody Is Really Happy with New Guidelines for Pun-
ishing White-Collar Criminals, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/22/white-collar-sentencing-reform_n_711982
6.html [https://perma.cc/TL6Y-JE4J] (discussing tension between advocates of
more lenient white-collar sentencing standards and advocates of stronger white-
collar sentencing standards).
10. See Kenneth Mann, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 5 (1985) (noting
white-collar defense counsel’s “commitment to helping the guilty go free”).
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against contractors,” answering these questions has become a top
priority.11
In United States v. Nagle,12 the Third Circuit set forth a blueprint for
sentencing those convicted of this type of fraud, known as Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise (DBE) fraud.13  The court weakened prosecutors’
chances of successfully seeking extremely long prison sentences when the
court allowed offsetting for contract performance in calculating how
much loss a defendant’s DBE fraud caused.14  This impediment, however,
affects only one aspect of federal criminal sentencing, and the court sug-
gested a basis for less, or perhaps more, leniency at the other aspects of the
sentencing process.15
In analyzing Nagle, this Casebrief will proceed in three parts.  Part II
will focus on the goals and potential abuse of the federal DBE program
and the mechanics of criminal sentencing in the Third Circuit.16  Part III
will address the facts, procedural history, and holding of Nagle.17  Part IV
will argue that the Third Circuit constrains prosecutors seeking long
prison sentences for those convicted of DBE fraud by allowing perform-
11. See Kim Slowey, The Coming Crackdown: Why Penalties for Construction Owners
Are on the Rise, CONSTRUCTION DIVE (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.construction
dive.com/news/the-coming-crackdown-why-penalties-for-construction-owners-are-
on-the-rise/407571/ [https://perma.cc/FC7A-CAEJ] (discussing government’s in-
creased focus on prosecuting unlawful conduct by construction contractors).
Slowey also notes one practitioner’s opinion that DBE requirements can be diffi-
cult for non-DBE firms to satisfy because “‘[t]here [are not] enough [DBE] firms
out there that really can do the actual work . . . .’” See id. (alteration in original)
(quoting attorney regarding legal work with respect to DBEs); see also Nicholas T.
Solosky, Contractor Alert: USDOT DBE Fraud Enforcement, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct.
30, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/10/contractor-alert-usdot-dbe-
fraud-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/GBG3-TUXQ] (“We are currently in the
midst of an unprecedented uptick in the prosecution of (alleged) government
contractor fraud . . . .”).
12. 803 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1238 (2016).
13. See id. at 183; see also Edward DeLisle & Jacqueline Ryan, Third Circuit Al-
lows for Offset when Calculating Loss in DBE Fraud Cases, FED. CONSTRUCTION CON-
TRACTING BLOG (Oct. 27, 2015), http://federalconstruction.phslegal.com/2015/
10/articles/contractor-information-sources/third-circuit-allows-for-offset-when-
calculating-loss-in-dbe-fraud-cases/ [https://perma.cc/3WDK-D9AU] (discussing
holding of Nagle).
14. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 183.  For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s
decision in Nagle, see infra notes 100–17 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011)) (noting U.S. district
courts determine criminal sentences following “three-step process”).  For a discus-
sion of the sentencing steps followed by the Third Circuit, see infra notes 61–74
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the federal DBE program, the goals of the program,
how the program is criminally abused, and how those convicted of such crimes are
sentenced in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 20–74 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the underlying facts of Nagle, the lower court’s deci-
sion, and the Third Circuit’s decision on appeal, see infra notes 75–117 and ac-
companying text.
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ance offsetting in calculating the proper U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
range.18  Finally, Part IV will also offer practical advice to prosecutors and
defense attorneys with respect to how a defendant convicted of DBE fraud
should be sentenced.19
II. LAYING A SOLID FOUNDATION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE
FEDERAL DBE PROGRAM AND THE MECHANICS OF CRIMINAL
SENTENCING IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Beginning in 1982, the DBE program has required federally-funded
agencies to spend a portion of their funds on contracts performed by
DBEs.20  The DBE program aims to prevent discrimination in the award of
federally-funded construction contracts.21  But the DBE program is often
the subject of fraud, with non-DBE companies scheming to obtain funds
not otherwise allocated to them.22  Courts are tasked with punishing these
defendant-companies, but they have some flexibility in determining
sentences.23
A. What Is the Federal DBE Program?
Congress created the DBE program for “recipients of federal trans-
portation . . . funds.”24  The DBE program requires all state and local
agencies “receiv[ing] at least $250,000 [in federal funds] in any fiscal year”
18. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision in Nagle, see infra
notes 121–28 and accompanying text.
19. For advice for prosecutors, see infra notes 129–38 and accompanying text.
For advice for defense attorneys, see infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
20. See Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program (DBE), FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/civilrights/programs/dbess.cfm [https://perma.cc/9E
6E-439T] (last updated Aug. 1, 2016) (providing overview of federal DBE pro-
gram).  For a brief history of the federal DBE program, see infra notes 24–34 and
accompanying text.
21. See Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.transportation.gov/civil-rights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise
[https://perma.cc/77U6-9TRU] (last updated Feb. 17, 2016) (discussing objec-
tives of federal DBE program).  For a discussion of the DBE program’s goals, see
infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
22. See Wally Zimolong, The Two Most Common Types of DBE Fraud, SUPPLEMEN-
TAL CONDITIONS (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.supplementalconditions.com/2014/
01/the-two-most-common-types-of-dbe-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/Z26F-GLKY]
(highlighting two common DBE varieties).  For additional discussion about how
the DBE program can be abused, see infra notes 43–60 and accompanying text.
23. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Restores Sentencing Powers of Federal Judges, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/washington/10cnd-
scotus.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9T5K-RP7B] (discussing discretionary sen-
tencing power of federal judges).  For a discussion of sentencing within the Third
Circuit, see infra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.
24. See 23 U.S.C. § 324 (2012); 49 C.F.R. §§ 26.1–26.109 (2016); see also
George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Pro-
grams, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 423 (2007) [hereinafter La Noue, Setting
Goals] (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.3); see also George R. La Noue, Western States’ Light:
Restructuring the Federal Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 22
4
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to apply “a certain percentage of the federal funds” to contracts with
DBEs.25  Only “socially and economically disadvantaged” businesses qual-
ify as DBEs.26
A business is considered socially disadvantaged if a majority of “the
business is owned and operated” by an individual from a “traditionally dis-
advantaged group” of people.27  Those receiving federal funds must either
directly hire a DBE prime contractor or hire a non-DBE prime contractor
that uses DBE subcontractors to complete a portion of the work.28  The
latter option can be particularly desirable because many DBEs are “often
not capable of taking on government-construction projects as main con-
tractors.”29  Once a DBE is hired to work a government-construction pro-
ject, the DBE must complete “commercially useful functions.”30
B. What Are the Goals of the Federal DBE Program?
The DBE program is an affirmative action program focusing primarily
on assisting certain “racial, ethnic, and gender classifications.”31  By ensur-
GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter La Noue, Western States’ Light]
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 31105(f) (2012)).
25. See La Noue, Setting Goals, supra note 24, at 423 (discussing federal DBE
program); see also La Noue, Western States’ Light, supra note 24, at 3 (discussing
same).
26. See La Noue, Setting Goals, supra note 24, at 423 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.5)
(discussing types of businesses that qualify as DBEs).
27. See Michael Yangming Xiao, Note, Deferred/Non Prosecution Agreements: Effec-
tive Tools to Combat Corporate Crime, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 237 (2013)
(discussing federal DBE program’s application to “businesses owned and operated
by traditionally disadvantaged groups”).  Further, as La Noue observes:
All women and minority owners are entitled to the presumption that they
are socially disadvantaged.  Their personal, educational, political, or so-
cial achievements are not considered relevant in considering whether
they are “disadvantaged.”  To be considered economically disadvantaged,
the firm owner’s net worth must be less than $750,000, not including
personal residence or the value of the business . . . . [F]or heavy and
highway construction firms to qualify for economic disadvantaged status,
DBEs must not have gross revenues averaging more than $27.5 million in
a three year period.
La Noue, Setting Goals, supra note 24, at 424 (footnotes omitted) (citing various
DOT regulations).
28. See La Noue, Western States’ Light, supra note 24, at 4 (discussing require-
ments of DBE).
29. See Xiao, supra note 28, at 237 (discussing limited size and resources of
DBEs and their ability to fulfill government contracts).
30. See id. at 237–38 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that perform-
ing “commercially useful functions” requires DBE to be “responsible for the execu-
tion of a distinct element of the work of a contract,” including “actually
performing, managing and supervising the work involved, and [furnishing] all su-
pervision, labor, tools, equipment, materials and supplies necessary to perform
that distinct element of the work of the contract”).
31. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2016) (listing objectives of federal DBE program);
Gerard P. Brady & Jared Hand, The Perils of Doing Business with Disadvantaged Busi-
ness Enterprises, 32 CONSTRUCTION L., 37, 37 (2012) (stating DBE program is “de-
signed to increase the participation of minority and disadvantaged business
5
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ing that some federal funds are always set aside to hire DBE companies,
the program aims to “increase both the competitiveness of DBEs and their
participation in state and local procurement.”32
The DBE program officially purports to prevent discrimination in
awarding federal Department of Transportation (DOT) contracts, so
DBEs can “compete fairly” with non-DBE companies on “a level playing
field.”33  Moreover, the program’s initiatives are designed to “remove bar-
riers to [ ] participation” that prevent DBEs from obtaining federally-
funded construction contracts, in turn helping DBEs develop business on
a broader scale.34
Justice Stevens buttressed this view in his dissent to Adarand Construc-
tors v. Pen˜a,35 where he noted that minority subcontractors are often sub-
ject to disadvantages less obvious “than direct, intentional racial
prejudice.”36  In Adarand, Adarand Constructors, Inc. (Adarand) chal-
lenged the constitutionality of rules that prompted a prime contractor to
award a federal guardrail subcontract to a DBE subcontractor, despite
Adarand’s bid being the lowest bid—a decision the prime contractor
made to get an extra payment for hiring a subcontractor presumed to be
disadvantaged.37  The court held “that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
enterprises . . . in federally funded public construction contracts”); La Noue, West-
ern States’ Light, supra note 24, at 4; Xiao, supra note 27, at 237 (stating the DBE
program was created “as an affirmative action program for businesses owned and
operated by traditionally disadvantaged groups”); Stephen Harrison, Construction –
Minority Participation Goals: Compliance Burden for the Construction Contractor, COHN
REZNICK, https://www.cohnreznick.com/construction-minority-participation-goals-
compliance-burden-construction-contractor [https://perma.cc/Q8UG-BF53] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2016) (providing overview of DBE program and noting goal of
allowing “DBEs to compete equally for contracts”).
32. See Xiao, supra note 27, at 237 (discussing goals of DBE program).
33. See Joseph M. Amico, Note, Affirmative Action in Construction Contracting
and New Jersey’s “Emerging Small Business Enterprise” Program, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 79, 84 (2015) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.1(b)) (discussing DOT’s DBE program
regulations).
34. See id. at 84–85 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.1) (highlighting DOT’s goals for
DBE program).
35. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
36. See id. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing additional challenges mi-
nority subcontractors may face).  In Adarand, a construction company challenged
the constitutionality of rules that prompted a prime contractor’s decision to award
a federal guardrail subcontract to a DBE subcontractor despite Adarand’s bid be-
ing the lowest bid—a decision the prime contractor made to get an extra payment
for hiring a subcontractor that was presumed to be disadvantaged. See id. at 205
(discussing background of case).
37. See id. (discussing factual background of case).  The payment sought by
the prime contractor was provided for in a provision of its contract with a division
of DOT, as required by federal law. See id.  The clause also required “a race-based
presumption of social and economic disadvantage.” See id. at 207 (citing 48 C.F.R.
§§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2)(1994)).
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reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”38  Justice Stevens, dissenting for rea-
sons beyond the scope of this Casebrief, wrote that minority subcontrac-
tors are more likely to have recently entered a particular industry,
resulting in fewer business relationships.39  Accordingly, minority subcon-
tractors are “less likely to receive favors from the entrenched business per-
sons who award subcontracts only to people with whom—or with whose
friends—they have an existing relationship.”40  Thus, when the DBE pro-
gram’s funds are misallocated, the program’s goals of “creat[ing] a level
playing field” and “remov[ing] barriers” for DBEs are undermined.41
C. What Are the Criminal Aspects of DBE Fraud?
DBE fraud itself is not a “statutorily-defined crime.”42  While DBE
fraud in the colloquial sense is not punishable under any particular stat-
ute, the underlying acts often subject the perpetrator to criminal liability
under traditional criminal statutes such as those prohibiting mail fraud,
wire fraud, and money laundering.43  Thus, businesses can face criminal
liability when they fail to comply with federal DBE regulations.44
38. See id. at 207 (discussing standard that must be applied to federally-re-
quired “race-based presumption of social and economic disadvantage”).
39. See id. at 261 (observing relative newness to industry may disadvantage
subcontractors).
40. See id.  Justice Stevens also noted that the DBE program is a “forward-
looking response to practical problems faced by minority subcontractors.” See id.
at 261–62.
41. See 49 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2016); see also H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d
233, 247–48 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing evidence of social barriers faced by disad-
vantaged businesses); Xiao, supra note 27, at 239 (noting negative impact on dis-
advantaged groups when funds are not allocated as prescribed); Elizabeth
McCormick, Tough Challenges Face Minority Contractors, LEDGER, http://www.theled
ger.com/news/20030427/tough-challenges-face-minority-contractors [https://per
ma.cc/J4QA-899F] (last updated Apr. 27, 2003, 9:21 AM) (discussing challenges
faced by minority construction contractors such as “financing, breaking through
the ‘good old boy’ network[,] and resistance to change”).
42. See Xiao, supra note 28, at 237 (noting non-existence of DBE fraud-specific
statutes).  Xiao also observes that DBE fraud, as a malum prohibitum crime, “is
wrongful because it is prohibited by law,” and the bad act is “commit[ting] other
statutorily-defined crimes” that forms the fraud. See id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 588 (9th ed. 2009)).  In contrast, malum in se crimes, such as murder or
rape, are crimes where “the act is bad in itself.” See id.  Due to this distinction, the
author asserts that those who commit DBE fraud “can more likely be rehabilitated
without imprisonment . . . .” See id.
43. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1957 (2012) (prohibiting mail fraud, wire
fraud, and money laundering, respectively); see also Michelle McVicker, The Real
Cost of DBE Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 4 (Mar. 2, 2016), https://cms.dot.gov/
sites/dot.gov/files/docs/S3TheRealCostofDBEFraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9
9M-AMMA] (listing numerous statutorily-defined crimes used to prosecute DBE
fraud).
44. See Lawrence Dany III & Patricia Gorham, Avoiding DBE Program Fraud,
CONSTRUCTION TODAY (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.construction-today.com/sec-
tions/columns/2649-avoiding-dbe-program-fraud [https://perma.cc/NBY5-B3
7
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DBE fraud harms victims in both “direct” and “indirect” ways.45  The
direct victims of DBE fraud are certified DBEs who did not get work set
aside for them by the DBE program, plus other non-DBE contractors who
abided by the rules but were not awarded government contracts.46  The
indirect victims of DBE fraud are taxpayers, whose “funds [are diverted
for] purposes other than [what was] intended by Congress.”47
DBE fraud does not typically result in any “serious” financial harm to
the involved parties—though the government’s funds are allocated im-
properly, there may be “little practical difference in having . . . a construc-
tion project done by a DBE subcontractor or a non-DBE subcontractor,
assuming that the quality of the work is similar.”48  Thus, the primary
harm DBE fraud causes is the disruption of the federal initiative to help
minority and female owners of construction businesses.49
DBE fraud occurs most frequently in two forms.50  First, DBE fraud
occurs when a non-DBE prime contractor claims to have used a DBE sub-
contractor, but actually performed the work itself.51  Second, DBE fraud
CU] (discussing “pitfalls associated with working on government contracts that in-
clude a DBE component”).
45. See Xiao, supra note 27, at 238 (discussing victims of DBE fraud’s limited
scope and unique impact on only traditionally disadvantaged social groups).
46. See McVicker, supra note 43, at 7 (discussing consequences of DBE fraud).
The author notes the DBE fraud prevents real DBEs from “grow[ing] and
build[ing] their businesses” and from “gain[ing] crucial experience.” See id.
47. See id. (noting that taxpayers are impacted when public funds are allo-
cated contrary to congressional intent).
48. See Xiao, supra note 28 at 238.
49. See id.; see also Alex Shea & Steve Pitaniello, DBE Fraud and the Cost of Non-
compliance, NAVIGANT, https://www.navigant.com/-/media/www/site/insights/
construction/2016/dbefraudandthecostofnoncompliance_ifh19.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/E6LB-VB8D] (explaining that meeting “10% DBE goal” for “the new Tap-
pan Zee Bridge project in New York . . . [would result in] approximately $314
million in contracts and subcontracts . . . awarded to DBEs”).
50. See Hanna Lee Blake, DBE Contractors and Those Working with DBEs Travel a
Highly Treacherous Road on Federally-Funded Highway Projects, WATT TIEDER (Summer
2015), http://watttieder.com/resources/articles/dbe-contractors-and-those-work-
ing-with-dbes [https://perma.cc/U79K-QF8R] (“The most common types of
schemes addressed in highly publicized DBE fraud cases and investigations are the
‘front scheme’ and the ‘pass-through scheme.’”); McVicker, supra note 43, at 5
(highlighting “front company” and “pass-through” schemes as two common forms
of DBE fraud); Zimolong, supra note 22 (discussing “fronting” and “pass-through
fraud” as most common forms of DBE fraud).
51. See McVicker, supra note 43, at 5 (discussing use of “front company” to
deceive federal agencies).  The author states that the “front company” used by the
non-DBE contractor “exists only on paper,” that the “[w]ork [is] done by the
prime or non-DBE subcontractor,” and that the fake “DBE is paid a small fee.” See
id.; William K. Rashbaum, Fraud Inquiries Focus on Public-Works Hiring in New York,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/nyregion/
24fraud.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6VER-4MUV] (noting utilization of “what
were essentially front companies to evade requirements” of DBE program);
Zimolong, supra note 22 (discussing use of “fronting” where a valid-seeming DBE is
“in reality . . . ‘controlled’ by a non-DBE”).
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can occur when a DBE serves as a mere “pass-through” for the non-DBE
prime contractor, which uses the DBE to obtain the contracts but does not
require the DBE to contribute meaningfully to the contract’s fulfillment.52
D. What Are the Mechanics of Sentencing Those Convicted of DBE Fraud
Within the Third Circuit?
Given the differences bound to occur between DBE fraud schemes,
along with prosecutors’ ability to charge different DBE fraud defendants
with different statutorily-defined crimes, the mechanics of federal criminal
sentencing must be examined.53  This subsection will address the mechan-
ics of criminal sentencing within the Third Circuit, which follows a “three-
step process” for sentencing defendants after United States v. Booker.54
First, the district court must properly “calculate[ ] the applicable [sen-
tencing] range” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).55
Though step one requires this calculation, the Guidelines are not binding
on the court—the range merely serves as the mandatory starting point
before proceeding to the next two steps.56  The amount of loss a defen-
52. See McVicker, supra note 43, at 5 (discussing use of “pass-through” to
deceive federal agencies).  In the “pass-through” scenario, the DBE is real and
“qualified to be a DBE, but [it] performs no commercially useful function,” be-
cause “[s]ome or all of the work [is] done by the prime or non-DBE subcontractor.
See id.  The author notes that the “DBE is paid a small fee” for its role in the
scheme. See id.; see also Rashbaum, supra note 51 (noting simplicity of pass-through
DBE fraud scheme); Zimolong, supra note 22 (discussing “pass-through fraud”
where “a non-DBE firm actually performs the work and [the] DBE firm collects a
commission for submitting invoices or payment applications to the general con-
tractor claiming it, rather than the non-DBE, performed the work”).
53. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal
justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prose-
cute.” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982)));
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[T]he decision whether or not
to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.”); Wayne R. LaFave et al., 4 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (4th ed. 2015) (“The notion that the prosecuting attorney is
vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when
not to is firmly entrenched in American law.”); Terrence M. Hicks, Top Ten In-
dicators of DBE Fraud & Abuse, LINKEDIN (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.linked
in.com/pulse/top-ten-indicators-dbe-fraud-abuse-terrence-m-hicks [https://pe
rma.cc/6X65-W6XB] (analyzing ten different factors that may be present indicat-
ing existence of DBE fraud).  For varying examples of DBE fraud schemes, see
supra text accompanying notes 53–57.
54. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
55. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing United
States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011)) (discussing first step of sentenc-
ing process, which “includes the application of any sentencing enhancements”).
For a look at the current guidelines, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(2015), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-man-
ual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL5A-PRVS] [hereinafter Guidelines
Manual].
56. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply
the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.” (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (5) (2012))); see also United States v.
9
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dant caused is a critical factor in calculating the proper Guidelines
range.57  Further, “[t]he amount of loss that a [DBE fraud] defendant is
found to have caused largely drives the determination of [the] recom-
mended sentencing range under the Guidelines.”58
Second, the district court must consider all departure motions—i.e.,
motions that allow the court to consider “depart[ing] from the applicable
guidelines range” when “there exists an aggravating or a mitigating cir-
cumstance . . . .”59  Though departures should apply only in “atypical
case[s],” the Guidelines do provide a list of reasons for adjusting a Guide-
lines range upward or downward.60  For example, the Guidelines en-
courage upward adjustments for harm to property that is not accounted
for, and for instances of “significant disruption of a governmental func-
tion.”61  The district court must explain the departure’s impact on the
range determination under the Guidelines after any departures are
granted.62
Third, the district court must consider applying any variances pursu-
ant to the statutory factors appearing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).63  This sec-
Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing importance of using Guide-
lines as one factor when calculating sentence).
57. See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sen-
tencing of Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757, 767 (2006) (noting
loss calculation was “single most important factor” in sentencing WorldCom CEO
Bernie Ebbers).
58. Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just
Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1003 (2010) (dis-
cussing importance of loss calculation in determining proper Guidelines range).
59. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A) (prescribing departure process); see also
Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing step two of sentencing process where all depar-
ture motions must be addressed).
60. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures
and Variances 5 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Guidelines
Manual, supra note 55, Ch. 1, Pt. A(4)(b)) (describing application of departures
and noting they should “only apply in the ‘atypical’ case lying outside the ‘heart-
land’ of conduct covered by the guidelines”); see also id. at 4–40 (providing over-
view of departures authorized by Guidelines).
61. See id. at 19–21 (quoting United States v. Cole, 357 F.3d 780 (8th Cir.
2004)).  Under the Guidelines, “[i]f the offense caused property damage or loss
not taken into account within the [G]uidelines, the court may increase the sen-
tence above the authorized guideline range” in an amount “depend[ent] on the
extent to which the harm was intended or knowingly risked and on the extent to
which the harm to property is more serious than other harm caused or risked by
the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.” See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5.  Addition-
ally, “[i]f the defendant’s conduct resulted in a significant disruption of a govern-
mental function, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized
[Guidelines] range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the im-
portance of the governmental function affected.” Id. § 5K2.7.
62. See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (citing United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152
(3d. Cir. 2011)) (discussing requirement that court explain changes made at step
two).
63. See id. (discussing step three of sentencing process where “court [must]
consider[ ] the recommended Guidelines range together with the statutory fac-
tors . . . and determine[ ] the appropriate sentence . . .” (citation omitted) (quot-
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss4/3
2016] CASEBRIEF 691
tion instructs courts to impose sentences “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary,” when issuing a sentence.64  Several factors should be consid-
ered, including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” (2) the
need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect of the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” and (3) the need for
deterrence.65  Courts complete this step by taking the range calculated in
step one, adding or subtracting any departures from step two, and increas-
ing or decreasing the range to reflect applied variances.66
E. Have Other Circuit Courts Ruled on DBE Fraud Sentencing?
The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have reviewed DBE fraud
cases and ruled on issues related to sentence determinations.67  First, in
United States v. Brothers Construction Co.,68 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
sentences of Brothers Construction Company of Ohio, Inc. (Brothers)
and Tri-State Asphalt Corp. (Tri-State) for their participation in a pass-
through DBE fraud scheme.69  The Fourth Circuit based its decision on
then-current Sentencing Guidelines when it affirmed the district court’s
loss calculation of $185,835.20—the amount “earmarked for DBE project
participation by Brothers.”70  Second, in United States v. Leahy,71 the Sev-
ing Wright, 642. F.3d at 152))).  Unlike departures, variances are not subject to
analysis under the Guidelines. See id. at 317 (quoting United States v. Floyd, 499
F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007)) (explaining that departures are deviations from the
Guidelines range based on “reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves,”
while variances are deviations “‘based on an exercise of the court’s discretion
under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)’”).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (instructing courts on application of
sentences).
65. See id. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (outlining factors courts should consider in de-
termining whether variance is appropriate).  This citation omits several other enu-
merated factors that typically deserve attention. See id. § 3553(a).  However, the
author has chosen to highlight factors that encompass DBE fraud’s inherent frus-
tration of DBE program goals.  For advice for practitioners, see infra notes 129–46
and accompanying text.
66. See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (citing Wright, 642 F.3d at 152) (discussing
court’s responsibility at step three of sentencing process and noting that variances
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “may vary upward or downward from the range
suggested by the Guidelines”).
67. See United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (af-
firming DBE fraud sentence); United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789-90 (7th
Cir. 2006) (remanding for recalculation of DBE fraud sentence under Guidelines);
United States v. Bros. Constr. Co. of Ohio, Inc., 219 F.3d 300, 321 (4th Cir. 2000)
(affirming DBE fraud sentence).
68. 219 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2000).
69. See id.  For a discussion of the complex factual history of the pass-through
DBE fraud scheme central to Brothers, see id. at 304–08 (explaining how Tri-State
and Brothers attempted to defraud government DBE program).
70. See id. at 318 (noting loss “as contemplated by the [G]uidelines”); see also
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Guidelines Manual 147 (Nov. 1, 1997), http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/1997/manual/CHAP2-
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2KP-S69U] [hereinafter 1997 Guidelines].
71. 464 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006).
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enth Circuit reached a similar conclusion when it remanded the district
court’s decision for re-sentencing.72  In Leahy, James Duff essentially
fooled government officials into thinking his companies, Windy City Main-
tenance and Remedial Environmental Manpower, were true DBEs.73  The
court based its decision on then-current Sentencing Guidelines when it
held that “[t]he district court . . . erred” by “computing the ‘total value of
the benefits diverted from intended recipients or uses’ . . . [and instead]
‘used the contract loss formula of contract price minus the benefit pro-
vided.’”74  Finally, in United States v. Maxwell,75 the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed Dewitt Jackson Maxwell’s sentence for his participation in a pass-
through DBE fraud scheme.76  Relying on the current Guidelines, the
Eleventh Circuit reached a result in line with Brothers and Leahy: the
amount of loss caused in DBE fraud cases is the sum of the DBE contracts
“diverted [from the program] to the unintended recipient.”77
III. BUILDING THE CASE: A SUMMARY OF THE FACTS, PROCEDURAL
HISTORY, AND HOLDING OF NAGLE
In Nagle, the Third Circuit reviewed a district court’s sentences of two
individuals convicted of DBE fraud.78  The court’s review focused on step
one of the sentencing process: whether the sentences issued by the district
court were calculated correctly under the Guidelines.79  The court held
72. See id. at 800 (remanding case to district court).
73. See id. at 778–81 (discussing factual background of case).
74. See id. at 790 (holding that U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 n.8(d) should have been used
to calculate loss caused by James Duff’s DBE fraud schemes).  To view a copy of the
1998 version of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 n.8(d), see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Guidelines
Manual 148 (Nov. 1, 1998), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guide
lines-manual/1998/manual/Chap2-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6P3-CYC7] [herein-
after 1998 Guidelines].
75. 579 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2009).
76. See id. at 1288 (“After thorough review, we affirm the convictions and the
sentence.”).  For the factual background of the case, see id. at 1288–95 (discussing
pass-through DBE fraud scheme run by Maxwell).
77. See id. at 1305–06 (analyzing loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.3(F)(ii)).  For
clarity, the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits each used the same Application
Note language in reaching their decisions, though the codification changed over
time. Compare 1997 Guidelines, supra note 70, at 147 (“In a case involving diversion
of government program benefits, loss is the value of the benefits diverted from
intended recipients or uses.”), with 1998 Guidelines, supra 74, at 148 (“In a case
involving diversion of government program benefits, loss is the value of the bene-
fits diverted from intended recipients or uses.”).  The Eleventh Circuit also cited
Brothers and Leahy in its decision. See id. at 1306 (discussing DBE fraud loss calcula-
tion in other circuit courts).
78. See, e.g., Linda Chiem, 3rd Circ. Orders Resentencing in $136M Hwy Contract
Fraud, LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2015, 8:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/709394
/3rd-circ-orders-resentencing-in-136m-hwy-contract-fraud [https://perma.cc/V9
MX-UNJN] (discussing Nagle); DeLisle, supra note 13 (discussing Nagle).  For a dis-
cussion of the facts of Nagle, see infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Chiem, supra note 78 (discussing Nagle); see also DeLisle, supra
note 13 (discussing Nagle); David A. Vicinanzo et al., Third Circuit Reins in Loss
12
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that the sentences were improperly calculated at step one because the dis-
trict court did not correctly determine the amount of loss for which each
defendant was responsible.80
A. The Facts of the Case
Joseph W. Nagle (Nagle) and Ernest G. Fink (Fink) owned and oper-
ated Schuylkill Products, Inc. (SPI) and CDS Engineers, Inc. (CDS), “a
wholly-owned subsidiary of SPI.”81  Neither company “qualified as” a
DBE.82  SPI and DBE-certified Marikina Engineers and Construction Cor-
poration (Marikina) worked together to procure federally-funded trans-
portation construction contracts in Pennsylvania.83  The companies
compensated Marikina by “pay[ing] Marikina a fixed fee for its participa-
tion” while they retained any profits.84
SPI’s use of Marikina constituted a classic “pass-through” DBE fraud
scheme.85  Under the agreement, Marikina performed no work on any of
the contracts it procured for SPI and CDS—in fact, SPI and CDS “per-
form[ed] all of the work” required by the DBE contracts.86  To hide the
Formula for DBE Fraud Prosecutions, NOW + NEXT: GOV’T INVESTIGATIONS & WHITE
COLLAR DEF. ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP, Washington, D.C.) (Oct. 2, 2015), http:/
/www.nixonpeabody.com/files/179946_GIWC%20Alert_2OCT15.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/VK3F-EQVV] (discussing Third Circuit’s reformulation of loss calculation
in Nagle).  For a discussion of the decision from the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, see infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 183 (3d Cir. 2015) (announcing
correct method for calculating loss in DBE fraud cases), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1238
(2016); see also DeLisle, supra note 13 (discussing Nagle); Chiem, supra note 78
(discussing Nagle); Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79 (discussing Nagle).  For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit’s decision, see infra notes 100–17 and accompanying text.
81. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 171–72 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing roles of Nagle and
Fink).  SPI focused on “mak[ing] concrete bridge beams for highway construction
[projects],” while CDS handled the installation of the beams. See Ex-Owner of
Schuylkill County Firm Sentenced in Largest Minority Business Fraud in U.S. History,
READING EAGLE (July 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.readingeagle.com/news/
article/ex-owner-of-schuylkill-county-firm-sentenced-in-largest-minority-business-
fraud-in-us-history [https://perma.cc/UAJ8-KCJN] (discussing sentencing of Fink
and noting corporate purposes of SPI and CDS).
82. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 172 (characterizing SPI and CDS as not possessing
DBE status).
83. See id. (referring to contractual agreement between SPI and Marikina
where Marikina would serve as SPI’s DBE subcontractor for federally-funded con-
struction projects, and noting that “Marikina was certified as a DBE . . . in Penn-
sylvania”).  Marikina was owned by “an American citizen of Filipino descent.” See
id.
84. See id. (discussing financial arrangement between SPI and Marikina).
85. See DeLisle, supra note 13 (noting SPI’s use of Marikina as pass-through);
McVicker, supra note 43 (discussing “pass-through” DBE fraud schemes);
Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79 (discussing Third Circuit’s reformulation of loss
calculation in Nagle); McVicker, supra note 43 (discussing “pass-through” DBE
fraud schemes); Rashbaum, supra note 51 (discussing pass-through DBE fraud
scheme); Zimolong, supra note 22 (discussing “pass-through fraud”).
86. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 172 (discussing mechanics of scheme).
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scheme, SPI and CDS took numerous steps to hide their true identities
during each project.87  Moreover, Marikina’s procurement efforts were ac-
tually conducted by SPI.88
SPI’s agreement with Marikina existed from 1993 to 2008.89  During
Fink’s ownership, Marikina obtained DBE contracts from PennDOT and
SEPTA “worth over $119 million” and $16 million, respectively.90  During
Nagle’s ownership, Marikina obtained “nearly $54 million” worth of
PennDOT and SEPTA DBE contracts.91
B. The District Court’s Decision
In November 2009, after an extensive investigation by federal authori-
ties, Nagle and Fink were “charged in a [thirty-two] count indictment”
stemming from their use of Marikina as a pass-through.92  After a jury
trial, Nagle was convicted of all but four of the charges asserted in the
87. See id. (discussing various actions taken by SPI and CDS to disguise identi-
ties while performing contracts).  SPI and CDS took many deceptive actions:
SPI used stationery and email addresses bearing Marikina’s name . . . .
[and] used Marikina’s log-in information to access PennDOT’s electronic
contract management system.  CDS employees who performed construc-
tion work on site used vehicles with magnetic placards of Marikina’s logo
covering SPI’s and CDS’s logos.  SPI and CDS employees used Marikina
business cards and separate cell phones to disguise whom they worked
for.  They also used a stamp of Cruz’s signature to endorse checks from
the prime contractors for deposit into SPI’s bank accounts.  Although
Marikina’s payroll account paid CDS’s employees, CDS reimbursed
Marikina for the labor costs.
Id.
88. See id. (noting SPI “identified subcontracts that SPI and CDS could fulfill,
prepared the bid paperwork, and submitted the information to prime contractors
in Marikina’s name”).
89. See id. (discussing duration of contractual relationship).
90. See id. (discussing DBE funds obtained while Fink owned and managed
SPI from 1993 to 2008).
91. See id. (discussing DBE funds obtained while Nagle owned and managed
SPI from 2004  to 2008).
92. See United States v. Nagle, Crim. No. 1:09-CR-384, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
159902, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2015) (discussing initial charges brought against
Nagle and Fink), appeal filed, No. 15-3974 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 2015); Press Release,
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle Dist. of Pa., Former Chief Operating Officer
and Co-Owner of Schuylkill Products Sentenced in Largest Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise Fraud in Nation’s History (July 14, 2014), available at https://www.just
ice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/former-chief-operating-officer-and-co-owner-schuylkill-pro
ducts-sentenced-largest [https://perma.cc/GW23-F8X8] (“The investigation was
conducted by the FBI, the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General’s
Office, the U.S. Department of Labor Inspector General’s Office, and the Criminal
Investigation Division of the IRS.”).  Nagle and Fink were charged with “one count
of conspiracy to defraud the United States . . . eleven counts of wire fraud . . . six
counts of mail fraud . . . one count of conspiracy to engage in unlawful monetary
transactions . . . and eleven counts of engaging in unlawful monetary transac-
tions . . . .” See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 173 (citations omitted).
14
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indictment.93  The district court found that Nagle’s Guidelines range
would increase by twenty-four levels due to the monetary loss he was found
to have caused: $53.9 million, “the face value of the PennDOT and SEPTA
contracts Marikina received while . . . [Nagle] was an executive . . . .”94
Similarly, the district court found that Fink’s Guidelines range would in-
crease by twenty-six levels due to the monetary loss for which he was re-
sponsible: $135.8 million, “the face value of the PennDOT and SEPTA
contracts Marikina received while [Fink] was an executive . . . .”95  The
district court calculated these ranges pursuant to the Guidelines, taking
into account the loss for which Nagle and Fink were responsible.96  Addi-
tionally, the district court held that Nagle and Fink “were not entitled to a
credit against the loss for the work performed” on the projects.97
The district court ultimately “sentenced [Nagle] to [eighty-four]
months of incarceration, one year of supervised release, a $25,000 fine, a
$2,600 special assessment, and no restitution.”98  Soon after, “[t]he Dis-
trict Court sentenced [Fink] to [fifty-one] months of incarceration, one
year of supervised release, a $25,000 fine, a $100 special assessment, and
no restitution.”99  Nagle and Fink subsequently appealed their sentences
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.100
C. The Third Circuit’s Reversal
In their appeals, “Nagle and Fink challenge[d] the District Court’s
calculation of the amount of loss they were responsible for under the Sen-
93. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 173 (discussing jury’s decision to convict Nagle on
certain charges).
94. See id. at 174–75 (noting loss caused by Nagle “amounted to a twenty-four-
level increase in the Guidelines offense level”).
95. See id. (noting loss caused by Fink “amounted to a twenty-six-level increase
in the Guidelines offense level”).
96. See id. at 174 (discussing calculation of loss under Guidelines).  The dis-
trict court calculated how much loss each was responsible for under section 2B1.1
of the Guidelines. See id.  Specifically, the court relied on Application Note
3(F)(ii) to 2B.1 of the Guidelines to hold that “the amount of loss was the face
value of the DBE contracts Marikina received” from PennDOT and SEPTA. See id.
For a discussion of the role loss plays in calculating a Guidelines range, see supra
notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
97. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 174 (discussing district court’s calculation of loss).
98. See id. at 175 (discussing district court’s original determination of Nagle’s
sentence).  In reaching Nagle’s sentence, the district court granted a departure
and a variance due to “the guideline range overstat[ing] the seriousness of the
offense . . . .” See United States v. Nagle, Crim. No. 1:09-CR-384, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159902, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2015), appeal filed, 15-3974 (3d Cir. Dec.
29, 2015).
99. Nagle, 803 F.3d at 175 (discussing district court’s original determination of
Fink’s sentence).  Like the court did for Nagle, the district court granted a depar-
ture for Fink due to “the guideline range’s overstatement of the seriousness of his
offense.” See Nagle, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159902, at *9–10.
100. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 175 (referring to timely appeals by Nagle and
Fink).
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tencing Guidelines.”101  Unlike the district court, the Third Circuit held
“that under either [Application Note 3(A) or 3(F)], the amount of loss
Nagle and Fink [were] responsible for [was] the face value of the [DBE]
contracts Marikina received minus the fair market value of the services they
provided under the contracts.”102
First, the court analyzed Application Note 3(A) and found it defined
loss as either “actual loss” or “intended loss,” whichever is greater.103  The
court then looked to applicable case law to hold that under Application
Note 3(A), loss was subject to offsetting for performance.104  The court
pointed out that “the amount of loss in [ ] fraud case[s], unlike [loss] in
[ ] theft case[s], often depends on the actual value received by the de-
frauded victim.”105
Applying this principle, the court concluded that, under Application
Note 3(A), Nagle and Fink were responsible only for “the value of the
[DBE] contracts Marikina received less the value of performance
[PennDOT and SEPTA received on those contracts.]”106  Second, the
101. See id. at 179 (discussing procedural posture of case).  The Third Circuit
examined Nagle and Fink’s criminal sentences first for “procedural and then sub-
stantive reasonableness.” See id. (citing United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567
(3d Cir. 2009)).  “Procedural reasonableness requires the District Court to calcu-
late the correct . . . sentencing range” for each defendant. See id. (citing Tomko,
562 F.3d at 567).  Further, an appellate court exercises plenary review when inter-
preting “loss.” See id. (quoting United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 309 (3d Cir.
2011)).
102. See id. at 180 (emphasis added).  The court first examined Section 2B1.1
of the Guidelines:
Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines governs the calculation of the offense
level for crimes involving, among other things, fraud and deceit.  Subsec-
tion (a) provides the base offense level . . . .  Subsection (b) provides an
extensive list of adjustments for offense-specific characteristics.  The first
of these adjustments—and the one relevant to this appeal—is the adjust-
ment for the amount of loss.  As the loss increases, the offense level
increases . . . .
Id. at 179.  Because “[t]he main text of the Guidelines does not define ‘loss’ . . . .
[the court] turn[ed] to the application notes that accompany § 2B1.1.” Id. (dis-
cussing content of section 2B1.1 Application Notes 3(A) and 3(F)).  Nagle and
Fink argued that the loss they caused should have been calculated under Applica-
tion Note 3(A) and that they were “entitled to a credit for the services they per-
formed” under either Application Note 3(A) or 3(F). See id. at 180.
103. See id. at 179 (defining “actual loss” and “intended loss” (quoting Guide-
lines Manual, supra note 55, § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i)-(ii)) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
104. See id. at 180 (quoting United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 825 (3d Cir.
1995)) (discussing “normal fraud cases ‘where value passes in both direc-
tions . . . .’”); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 210 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 5558 (7th Cir. 1991)) (calculating
loss by “offset[ting] the contract price by the actual value of the components pro-
vided”).  The court pointed out that Dickler interpreted a different section of the
Guidelines—§ 2F1.1—but notes that § 2F1.1 was merged into § 2B1.1 in 2001. See
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 180 n.7.
105. See id. at 181 (quoting Nathan, 188 F.3d at 210).
106. See id. (applying loss formula).
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court analyzed Application Note 3(F)(ii), “assuming that the DBE pro-
gram [was] a ‘government benefit’” for purposes of its analysis.107  The
court found that under Application Note 3(F)(ii), Nagle and Fink would
be responsible for the full value of the DBE contracts because profits are
“not the only benefit [a] DBE obtains when it receives [ ] contract[s].”108
In addition to profits, the court identified a DBE’s opportunity to form
and develop business connections with “suppliers, labor, and the broader
industry” as a key benefit denied to DBEs when non-DBEs actually per-
form the work.109
But the court went further and found Nagle and Fink were also enti-
tled to a credit for contract performance under Application Note
3(F)(ii).110  Under Application Note 3(E)(i), the court held that the fair
market value of services rendered to the victim by the defendant before
the fraud was discovered must be used to offset the loss caused by the
defendant.111  Thus, under Application Note 3(F)(ii), the court again
found that the loss caused by Nagle and Fink was the “full face value of the
contracts” obtained by Marikina minus the fair market value of the services
SPI and CDS rendered to PennDOT and SEPTA.112
107. See id.  The court noted that under this Application Note, “ ‘loss’ is ‘not
less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted to
unintended uses.’” See id. (quoting Guidelines Manual, supra note 55, § 2B1.1 cmt.
n.3(F)(ii)).
108. See id. at 181 (discussing government’s arguments and Nagle and Fink’s
counterarguments regarding what part of DBE program constitutes benefit under
Application Note 3(F)(ii)).  The government argued that the benefits were the
total “face value of the [DBE] contracts Marikina [ ] [received].” See id.  In re-
sponse, Nagle and Fink argued that “the profit SPI and CDS earned on the con-
tracts” was the only benefit. See id.
109. See id. (discussing full value of DBE program).  The court explained that
SPI and CDS put the entire value of the contract to use for a different purpose—
SPI and CDS profited from the DBE contracts and developed their own business
connections. See id.  Nagle and Fink were unable to persuade the court to use a
different definition of the word “benefit” under section 2C1.1 of the Guidelines,
which defines the term as “the benefit that is offered as a bribe to an official.” See
id.  Nagle and Fink also unsuccessfully argued that benefit means “net loss.” See id.
110. See id. (discussing application note entitling Nagle and Fink to full credit
for contract performance).
111. See id. at 181–82 (“Application Note 3(E)(i) to § 2B1.1 states that ‘the
fair market value of the property returned and the services rendered, by the defen-
dant or other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the
offense was detected’ shall be credited against the loss.” (quoting Guidelines Man-
ual, supra note 55, § 2B1.1 cmt.3 n.(E)(i))).  The court found that Application
Note 3(E)(i) applied to 3(F)(ii). See id. at 182.
112. See id. at 181; see also id. at 182 (“Here, Note 3E(i) means that we must
subtract the ‘fair market value’ of the ‘services rendered’ by SPI and CDS on the
contracts before arriving at a final loss value.”).  The government argued that “Na-
gle and Fink [were] not entitled to a credit under [Application] Note 3(E)(i) be-
cause as non-DBEs they did not ‘render any valuable services . . . .” See id. at 181.
The court rejected this argument:
Although the DBE program cares about who performs the work, it also
requires that the work be completed.  The transportation agencies re-
quired—and received—the construction of concrete materials.  They did
17
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Finally, the court briefly addressed the government’s argument that
no other courts had allowed offsetting for performance in DBE fraud
cases.113  Though the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits had not per-
mitted performance offsetting, the court declined to follow their decisions
because the Fourth and Seventh Circuits decided the cases under the ear-
lier version of the Guidelines.114  Moreover, the court found that the Elev-
enth Circuit’s decision “merely relied on [the Fourth and Seventh Circuit
decisions]” in reaching the same conclusion.115
As a result, the court “vacate[d] Nagle’s and Fink’s sentences, and
remanded [the case] for resentencing.”116  Notably, however, the court
concluded by advising future district courts undertaking DBE fraud sen-
tencing to “keep in mind the goals of the DBE program that have been
frustrated by the fraud.”117
IV. HARDHATS REQUIRED: AN INSPECTION OF NAGLE AND ADVICE FOR
PRACTITIONERS ON HOW TO APPROACH THIRD CIRCUIT DBE
FRAUD SENTENCING
By allowing DBE fraud convictions to be offset by contract perform-
ance, the court significantly weakened prosecutors’ chances of successfully
seeking lengthy prison terms for those convicted of DBE fraud.118  But this
obstacle mainly presents a challenge for prosecutors at step one of the
sentencing process, and the court suggested that frustrated DBE program
not receive the entire benefit of their bargain, in that their interest in
having a DBE perform the work was not fulfilled, but they did receive the
benefit of having the building materials provided and assembled.
Id.
113. See id. (rejecting “Government’s primary argument [ ] that other
courts . . . consider[ing] the issue of DBE fraud . . . have not allowed a credit
against the face value of the contracts received in calculating the loss”).
114. See id. (discussing Fourth and Seventh circuit decisions that “were de-
cided using the previous Guidelines provision on fraud and deceit, § 2F1.1,” and
adding “[t]his difference is important, because the old § 2F1.1 had an application
note similar to current Note 3(F)(ii) . . . but no application note similar to current
Note 3(E)(i)”).  The court stated that “neither the Fourth nor Seventh Circuits
had occasion to consider whether Note 3(E)(i) required that the services rendered
be credited against the loss.” See id.; see also United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,
789–90 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring to previous provision not permitting credit for
performance in DBE fraud scheme); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co. of Ohio,
219 F.3d 300, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing same).
115. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 182–83 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d
1282, 1305–07 (11th Cir. 2009)) (discussing Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Brothers
and Leahy without considering Application Note 3(E)(i)).
116. See id. at 183 (stating conclusion).
117. See id.  For a discussion of how prosecutors can use this statement to
argue for greater sentences, see infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
118. See Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79 (discussing possible impact of Nagle on
sentencing and acknowledging “offset for services rendered [that] would bring the
loss amount to zero”).  For a discussion of how Nagle could significantly shorten
sentences for DBE fraud convictions, see infra notes 121–28 and accompanying
text.
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goals should be used by prosecutors to argue for fewer leniencies at steps
two and three.119  On the other hand, defense attorneys can combat the
efforts of an aggressive prosecutor at steps two and three by focusing on
how the goals of the program were not as frustrated as they may seem.120
A. The Third Circuit Weakens Prosecutors’ Chances of Successfully Seeking
Lengthy Sentences in DBE Fraud Cases
After Nagle, prosecutors will have a more difficult time securing long
sentences in DBE fraud cases because convictions can be offset by contract
performance.121  At step one of federal criminal sentencing, courts deter-
mine an appropriate Guidelines range in part by calculating how much
loss a defendant is responsible for.122  This loss calculation essentially dic-
tates the appropriate sentencing range.123  Because Application Notes
3(A) and 3(F)(ii) are both subject to contract performance offsetting,
utilizing either Application Note 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) in a DBE fraud case will
result in a lower loss calculation—and a significantly diminished sen-
tence—when a non-DBE fully performs the contract.124
119. See Vollrath, supra note 58, at 1003 (discussing how loss calculation at
step one of sentencing affects determination of proper Guidelines range).  Be-
cause step one factors in a loss calculation, it follows logically that the Third Cir-
cuit’s statement about DBE program goals can be considered at steps two and
three of the sentencing process, where federal judges possess much discretion. See
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b), 5K2.0(a)(1)(A) (prescribing sentencing steps); see also Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the
Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.” (quoting United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982))); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[T]he decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecu-
tor’s] discretion.”); United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d. Cir. 2011)) (discussing variances at
step three); LaFave, supra note 53 (“The notion that the prosecuting attorney is
vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when
not to is firmly entrenched in American law.”); Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79
(stating that Nagle “could mean more discretion-based arguments for higher
sentences from the government, separate from the loss amount”).  For advice for
prosecutors on how to approach DBE fraud sentencing, see infra notes 129–38 and
accompanying text.
120. See MANN, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing role of defense attorneys in
white-collar crime prosecutions).  For advice for defense attorneys on how to ap-
proach DBE fraud sentencing, see infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
121. See Vicinanzo, supra note 79 (stating that Third Circuit’s decision in Na-
gle “[c]urtail[s] an aggressive loss theory” previously used by prosecutors).  For a
discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding in Nagle, see supra notes 100–17 and ac-
companying text.
122. For a discussion of step one of the federal criminal sentencing process,
see supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
123. See Vollrath, supra note 58, at 1016–20 (discussing loss calculation’s effect
on ultimate determination of sentencing range under Guidelines for white-collar
offenders).
124. See United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 180 (2015) (holding that offset-
ting for contract performance applies under either Application Note 3(A) or
3(F)(ii)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1238 (2016); see also Vollrath, supra note 58 (dis-
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Of course, this only holds true if the non-DBE actually rendered per-
formance on the contract.125  If a non-DBE performed only a portion of a
fraudulently obtained contract—perhaps because its efforts were inter-
rupted by law enforcement—the face value of the entire contract would be
offset by only the portion of the contract actually performed, leading to a
higher loss calculation and greater sentence.126
The court also advised district courts undertaking DBE fraud sentenc-
ing to be aware of the DBE program’s objectives.127  Having already estab-
lished the offsetting procedure for step one of the sentencing process, the
court seemed to suggest that the DBE program’s “frustrated” purposes
could prove useful at steps two and three of the sentencing process, where
the court considers granting departures and variances.128
B. Advice for Third Circuit Federal Prosecutors
Prosecutors can make solid, Nagle-based arguments at each step of the
federal sentencing process.129  At step one, prosecutors should focus on
distinguishing the facts of their case from the facts of Nagle.130  For in-
cussing importance of loss calculation on sentencing).  Because a smaller amount
of loss at step one will likely result in a lower base offense level, a lesser sentence is
more likely with contract-performance offsetting. See id.  For a discussion of offset-
ting DBE fraud convictions for contract performance, see supra notes 121–28 and
accompanying text.
125. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 180 (announcing formula for offsetting); see also
Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79 (“[W]here the work was fully completed . . . an
offset for services rendered thus would bring the loss amount to zero.”).  The im-
plication of the author’s statement is that any offsetting for performance will be
commensurate with the amount of services actually rendered—i.e., if a non-DBE
renders half of the work due on the project, the loss will be the face value of the
contracts minus the value of the half of the services rendered. See id. (referring to
Nagle court’s loss calculation).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 183 (3d Cir. 2015) (“If possible and when relevant, the district
court should keep in mind the goals of the DBE program that have been frustrated
by the fraud.”).
128. See id. (discussing aims of DBE program); Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79
(suggesting use of “more discretion-based arguments . . . separate from the loss
amount”).  Though this statement has been made in relation to prosecutors, this
principle would apply to both sides of the adversarial criminal justice process.  For
a discussion of steps two and three of the federal sentencing process, see supra
notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
129. See Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79 (“[This decision] could mean more
discretion-based arguments for higher sentences from the government, separate
from the loss amount.”). Nagle-based arguments can be made at each step, though
“discretion-based” arguments are much more relevant at steps two and three be-
cause step one is the calculation of the recommended Guidelines range. See
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4),
(5) (2012)) (discussing step one of federal sentencing process).
130. See Eugene Volokh, Analogizing and Distinguishing Cases, VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Aug. 10, 2009, 2:26 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1249928819.shtml
[https://perma.cc/T9K8-GKHE] (discussing framework for distinguishing cases).
For a summary of the facts in Nagle, see supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
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stance, in Nagle, SPI and CDS used Marikina as a pass-through DBE to
obtain DBE contracts fraudulently.131  Would offsetting still apply if SPI
and CDS had simply lied about their DBE status, instead of actually includ-
ing a real DBE in the plan?132
At step two, prosecutors should focus heavily on the DBE program’s
frustrated goals in seeking upward departures.133  For instance, under the
encouraged upward departure for “property loss or damage not taken into
account” by the sentence, prosecutors should argue that the Guidelines do
not effectively cover the loss to indirect victims, such as taxpayers whose
hard-earned dollars went to “purposes [not intended] by Congress.”134
Additionally, prosecutors should argue that the DBE fraud constituted a
“significant disruption” of the DBE program—“a governmental func-
tion”—by misallocating the government’s funds and depriving tradition-
ally disadvantaged groups the benefit of the government’s assistance.135
Prosecutors should approach step three similarly.136  For instance,
under the first factor of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “the nature and circum-
stances of the offense,” prosecutors should argue that the defendant’s con-
duct was reprehensible in that it prevented the DBE program from
leveling the playing field for traditionally disadvantaged business owners
and effectively built an extra barrier to entry for them.137  These subverted
131. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 172 (discussing Marikina’s role as pass-through
DBE).
132. See United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2006) (discuss-
ing James Duff’s deceptive conduct resulting in DBE certification for his non-DBE
companies).  For a discussion of other variations of DBE fraud schemes that a pros-
ecutor may find helpful in determining how to distinguish a case from the facts of
Nagle, see supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
133. See Vicinanzo et al., supra note 79 (suggesting prosecutors can make “dis-
cretion-based arguments for higher sentences . . . separate from the loss amount”);
see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A) (prescribing departure process).  For a discus-
sion of step two of the sentencing process, see supra notes 67–70.
134. See McVicker, supra note 43 (listing taxpayers as victims of DBE fraud);
see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5 (providing grounds for upward departure when loss is not
effectively covered by sentence).
135. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5; United States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 826, 829–30 (10th
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he provision is concerned with degree of disruption and impor-
tance of governmental function disrupted.” (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5)); see also 49
C.F.R. § 26.1 (2016) (stating intended benefits of federal DBE program); Adarand
Constructors v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 261 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowl-
edging challenges faced by businesses owned by members of traditionally disadvan-
taged groups); H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 247–49 (4th Cir. 2010)
(discussing evidence of barriers faced by DBEs); Xiao, supra note 27, at 239 (not-
ing negative impact on minority-owned businesses when DBE funds are diverted
from program).
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (providing grounds for variances).  Like
step two, where prosecutors used the letter of the law from U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5 to
argue for higher sentences, step three also requires prosecutors to root their argu-
ments in specific language.  For a discussion of step three of the federal sentencing
process, see supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see also 49 C.F.R. § 26.1 (stating intended
goals of federal DBE program).  For a discussion of variances, see supra note 71
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goals should also be referred to by prosecutors when arguing for upward
variances based on the two other factors: retribution for the conduct, and
deterrence of others acting similarly.138
C. Advice for Third Circuit Defense Attorneys
Defense attorneys should focus their efforts on ensuring that offset-
ting for contract performance is applied at step one, and combatting any
arguments for upward departures or variances at steps two and three.139
At step one, defense attorneys should argue that Nagle is binding prece-
dent upon district courts within the Third Circuit, requiring offsetting for
contract performance in DBE fraud cases regardless of the specific
facts.140
At step two, defense attorneys should point out that the court’s state-
ment suggesting attention to the DBE program’s frustrated goals neither
explicitly states that the frustrated goals get special attention at step two,
nor is binding on the court due to its status as dicta within the Nagle deci-
sion.141  Moreover, defense attorneys should point out that the district
court in Nagle issued downward departures for Nagle and Fink on grounds
that the sentence overstated the seriousness of their offenses.142  Defense
attorneys should respond to any prosecutor arguments for upward depar-
and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the DBE program’s goals, see supra
notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
138. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)–(B).  Subsection (2)(A) of the stat-
ute permits upward variances based on “the need . . . to provide just punishment
for the offense,” which is how the need for retribution enters the mix. See id.
§ (a)(1)(2)(A).  “Retribution” is defined as “[p]unishment imposed for a serious
offense.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1511 (10th ed. 2014).
139. See United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (“‘[T]he
victim’s loss will normally be the difference between the value he or she gave up
and the value he or she received.’” (quoting United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818,
825 (3d Cir. 1995))), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1238 (2016).  Though the Third Circuit
announced a new method of calculating loss in DBE fraud cases, three other cir-
cuits have previously reviewed DBE fraud sentences and held that the total amount
of loss was equivalent to the total amount of diverted DBE contracts. See United
States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305–07 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Leahy,
464 F.3d 773, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d
300, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2000).
140. See United States v. Nagle, No. 14-3184, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir. Sept. 30,
2015), available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/143184p.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MLR5-KRED] (marking opinion as “precedential”).
141. See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 183 (“If possible and when relevant, the District
Court should keep in mind the goals of the DBE program that have been frus-
trated by the fraud.”).  The court’s suggestion is void of any reference to any spe-
cific federal sentencing steps. See id.; see also Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2005) (discussing role played by
dicta and noting that dicta is not “presumptively binding”).
142. See United States v. Nagle, Crim. No. 1:09-CR-384, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
159902, at *16–18 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2015) (ordering downward departure for
Nagle and Fink’s sentences after Third Circuit review and remand), appeal filed,
No. 15-3974 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 2015).
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tures based on unaccounted-for property loss or damage by arguing that
damage to indirect victims of DBE fraud is simply not calculable due to
the “amorphous” and non-descript nature of the victims.143  A strong re-
sponse to a prosecutor’s argument that the DBE fraud disrupted a govern-
mental service would be that there “simply [are not] enough” DBEs
available to perform projects, and the available DBEs may not be equipped
to handle certain projects on their own.144
At step three, defense attorneys should respond to prosecutors’ argu-
ments for upward variances based on “the nature and circumstances of the
offense,” the need for retribution, and the need for deterrence by arguing
that the sentence determined in step one is sufficient and that any upward
variance would be “greater than necessary.”145  The defense attorney
should also point out that mere subversion of the DBE program’s goals is
covered in the sentence already, even with offsetting for contract
performance.146
V. CONCLUSION
In Nagle, the Third Circuit changed the blueprint for sentencing
those convicted of DBE fraud.147  The court made it much more difficult
for prosecutors to seek extremely long DBE-fraud sentences by allowing
offsetting for contract performance during step one of the sentencing pro-
cess.148  But the court advised future district courts undertaking DBE
fraud sentencing to keep the frustrated goals of the DBE program in
mind, inviting prosecutors and defense attorneys to focus on the under-
mined goals of the program when arguing at steps two and three of the
sentencing process.149  Practitioners can work to increase or decrease a
143. See Henning, supra note 1, 32–33 (stating nature of victims is difficult to
ascertain for purposes of sentencing white-collar offenders); McVicker, supra note
43 (listing taxpayers as victims of DBE fraud); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5 (providing
basis for upward departures when “the offense caused property damage or loss not
taken into account within the [G]uidelines . . . .”).
144. See id. (providing grounds for upward departure when government ser-
vice disrupted); see also Slowey, supra note 11 (discussing quantity of DBEs that are
capable of performing construction work).
145. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) (2012).  This argument would be
based on the statute’s requirement that “[t]he court . . . impose a sentence suffi-
cient, but not greater than, necessary . . . .” See id. § 3553(a).  Thus, determining
what is “necessary” to punish the defendant will be key. See id.
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).  This argument would focus on the stat-
ute’s language stating that there is a “need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect
the seriousness of the offense . . . .” See id.
147. For an analysis of Nagle, see supra notes 75–117 and accompanying text.
148. For an analysis of Nagle’s impact on criminal sentencing, see supra notes
121–28 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s suggestion that future courts cal-
culating DBE fraud sentences should stay mindful of the DBE program’s goals, see
supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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defendant’s DBE fraud sentence by incorporating these arguments into
their adversarial efforts.150
150. For advice for prosecutors and defense attorneys, see supra notes 129–46
and accompanying text.
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